This article uses a by-production approach that integrates credit risk to monitor bank efficiency.
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the Iranian government has implemented a series of regulatory reforms in the banking sector with the aim of increasing the efficiency of financial markets and strengthening economic activity and entrepreneurship. The most significant policies removed barriers to entry for private banks in 2001 and imposed different deposit interest rates and conditions on government-owned and private banks in 2005. 1 The latter obliged all banks to reduce their lending rates significantly and forced government-owned banks to set their deposit and lending rates at least three percentage points lower than those offered by private banks. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) mandated that government-owned banks give priority in lending to less-developed sectors such as small and medium enterprises (SMEs) after 2004. proportion of banking loans decreased to 30 percent, and the ratio of government-owned commercial bank NPLs also dropped and remained steady at approximately 6 percent. In this article, we argue that although the reforms could substantially increase the level of competition in the market and help the government provide more job opportunities by developing new enterprises and improving SME performance, they may have encouraged banks to orient their businesses toward higher risk clients, which leads to higher credit risk and lower financial 1 Ten private banks joined the market from 2001. The sector is currently dominated by 10 government-owned institutions, including six commercial banks and four specialized banks. The specialized banks mainly focus on special services in their specific areas of interest such as mining, manufacturing, agriculture, and housing. 2 The CBI is responsible for supporting economic growth in Iran by implementing appropriate monetary and credit policies and assisting the government to create stabilization and economic development programs (CBI, 2006) . As the CBI is not independent of the government, banks' ability to manage their credit policies, specifically government-owned banks, is extremely limited.
efficiencies. Therefore, a study of bank efficiency and credit risk management in both the preand post-reform periods is particularly pertinent. Although the relationship between efficiency and risk is well documented, previous studies of banking efficiency in Iran have not allowed for credit risk (e.g. Arjomandi et al., 2011; 2012) . As stated by Mester (1996 Mester ( , p.1026 , "unless quality and risk are controlled for, one might easily miscalculate a bank's level of inefficiency, e.g., banks scrimping on credit evaluations or producing excessively risky loans might be labelled as efficient when compared to banks spending resources to ensure their loans are of higher quality". Therefore, this study estimates and compares Iranian banks' traditional and credit-risk-adjusted technical efficiencies in the period 1998-2012. The credit risk is assessed by the levels of NPLs, which are included in the technology as undesirable outputs. These estimates are grounded in bias-corrected efficiency scores using the subsampling techniques of Simar and Wilson (2011) .
The contribution of this study is manifold. First, we propose to use an innovative methodological approach to include undesirable outputs (such as NPLs) in the production technology modeling to measure banks' technical inefficiency. This new measure extends the by-production model of Murty et al. (2012) by including statistical aspects and is adapted to the banking system. The uniqueness and contribution of this approach (by-production) lies in the estimation of two sub-technologies, one related to the production of good outputs and the other to the production of bad outputs. To assess the bank performance values even more precisely than the traditional approaches, we also used a model based on the enhanced Russellbased directional distance measures discussed in Chen et al. (2014) . Overall, the by-production approach offers the advantage of easy inclusion of undesirable outputs by considering two distinct sub-production frontiers and also provides a good sketch of all the processes involved in a decision-making unit (DMU).
3 From a technical perspective, the by-production model overcomes the misspecification issues related to the commonly assumed weak disposability (WDA) concept (Färe et al, 1989 , Kuosmanen, 2009 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of studies on the Iranian banking system. The methodology is presented in Section 3. Sections 4
and 5 discuss the data and the results, respectively, followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
Empirical research on Iranian bank efficiency
To date, several studies have analyzed the performance of the Iranian banking industry. Hadian and Hosseini (2004) investigated the intermediation activities of six commercial and four specialized Iranian banks between 1997 and 1999, finding that the specialized banks were significantly more technically efficient than their commercial competitors. Hasanzadeh (2007) used the same approach as Hadian and Hosseini (2004) to estimate the technical efficiency of all Iranian banks between 1997 and 2003. Hasanzadeh found that private banks were more technically efficient than government-owned banks and observed that government control had a negative influence on the control of inputs and outputs within the government-owned banks.
The most recent studies of bank efficiency and productivity within the Iranian banking sector were undertaken by Arjomandi et al. (2011; 2012) for the pre-and post-regulation period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and used different efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) indices. focused on the efficiency of a single bank's branches (Hakimabady et al., 2006; Dadgar and Nemat, 2007) . Overall, in all of these studies, the banks' most undesirable output-NPLs-is not taken into account. In addition, their databases only extend to the year 2008, which is only three years after the introduction of the most recent banking regulation and does not provide a sufficiently long period to accurately investigate the effect of the 2005 policies. To fill these important gaps in the literature, this study incorporates NPLs as a proxy of credit risk in the production process to provide a more accurate and realistic analysis of Iranian banks over the period from 1998 to 2012. Allowing for credit risk is particularly important in the case of banks because not only is it desirable for the banks to be efficient, but they must also be secure.
Altunbas et al. (2000), Drake and Hall (2003) , Pasiouras (2008) and Salim and Hoque (2010) , inter alia, note that failure to adequately account for risk can have a major impact on relative efficiency scores.
Methodology and risk-adjusted efficiency appraisal
In this study, the nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) programming technique is employed to estimate production frontiers and measure efficiency relative to these frontiers.
This approach (DEA) has been extensively used to evaluate the technical performance of DMUs (Seiford, 1996; Cooper et al., 2007; Lampe and Hilgers, 2015) . The literature on the efficiency of financial institutions using DEA has expanded rapidly in recent decades. Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) , in their comprehensive survey of 196 bank performance studies, revealed that recent DEA studies have examined nearly all of the banking sectors in the world. After the widespread use of DEA in developed countries, it has also become a popular method used by banking researchers from developing countries to evaluate financial institutions. Sathye (2003) , Ataullah and Le (2006) , Drake et al. (2006) , Isik (2008), and Pasiouras (2008) are among the studies from developing countries. The most relevant advantage of DEA, in the context of this study, is that it works well with small sample sizes. As there are currently only 20 banks in Iran's banking system, the banking industry is less conducive to the use of parametric (econometric) analysis techniques. There are also other important advantages of this technique:
there is no need to have a specific form for the production function; there is no restriction on the functional form of the production relationship; and it is able to use data on various inputs and outputs and indicate the magnitude of inefficiency.
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) (1978) developed DEA and extended the economic aspect of linear programming, which was introduced by Farrell (1957) twenty years earlier.
This technique constructs a nonparametric piece-wise surface or efficient frontier, and the efficiency measures of DMUs are then estimated relative to this frontier. The CCR model assumed the existence of both constant returns to scale (CRS) and input orientation in calculating the resulting technical efficiency indices. The CRS assumption can be appropriate when all DMUs are functioning at an optimal scale. Nevertheless, due to imperfect competition, financial limitations, government control and regulation (such as the banking environment in Iran), a DMU may not actually perform at its optimal scale. Thus, the use of a CRS specification, when production is not at its optimal level, will yield distorted technical efficiency scores (Arjomandi, 2011; Salim et al., 2016) . Therefore, subsequent studies, such as Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) (known as the BCC model) and Färe et al. (1983) ,
suggested an extension to account for VRS. The use of the VRS specification enables the calculation of technical efficiency free of these scale-efficiency distortion effects. In addition, as pointed out in Chambers and Pope (1996, p.1364) , "while constant returns may make sense for some stylized 'representative firm' presumed to be in long-run equilibrium, it certainly does not make sense for most real-world observations". Hence, we run our DEA models under the VRS assumption in this study. Assaf et al. (2013) argue that both desirable and undesirable outputs should be present in a model and state that using only desirable outputs will fail to acknowledge a banks' effort to reduce its undesirable outputs and may bias the results. For instance, if inefficiency exists in the production process, whereby final intermediation services are produced with an increase in NPLs, the production of NPLs is undesirable and must be reduced to improve performance.
One may treat the undesirable outputs as inputs. However, Seiford and Zhu (2002) and Zhu (2009) state that this does not reflect the true production process. 5 Some studies have examined the impact of credit risk on bank efficiency by including loan loss provisions as an additional input (see, inter alia, Drake et al., 2006; Pasiouras, 2008) . For the advocates of this process in the presence of undesirable outputs, in the case of bank efficiency estimation, NPLs can be viewed as a cost that is required to build up loan loss reserves. However, it may not reflect the quality of the credit risk management, particularly in the context of Iranian banks. NPLs have been considered as a control variable in specified efficiency functions in some cases, such as Mester (1996) and Berger and Mester (1997) . However, we argue that NPLs are outputs of the banking production system and should not be considered as exogenous to the producing technology.
In this study, following Pastor (1999) , Chang and Chiu (2006) , Chen (2009), and Fukuyama and Weber (2010) , NPLs are viewed as an undesirable by-product output arising from the production of loans and taken into account as a proxy of credit risk to obtain "riskadjusted efficiency measures". In this line, many studies are based on efficiency assessments using the WDA concept that consider NPLs to be a weakly disposable output, and thus, any effort to reduce the undesirable output will necessarily involve a proportional decrease in the good output (Park and Weber, 2006 , Fukuyama and Weber, 2010 , Barros et al., 2012 Nevertheless, serious weaknesses associated with the use of the WDA have previously been discussed by Chen (2014) using an illustrative example. Further, the theoretical irrelevance of the WDA has been proved by Murty et al. (2012) . Overall, it appears that the WDA does not provide the right trade-offs between the variables involved in the production technology.
As mentioned previously, this study relies on a by-production model that is based on the modeling of two sub-technologies (one for good output and the other for the unwanted outputs).
Assume a set of n observations on the DMUs where each uses inputs, ( = 1,2, … , ), to produce s good outputs, , and bad outputs, ( = 1, … , ). Using the enhanced Russell-based directional distance measures (ERBDDM), discussed in Chen et al. (2014) , and the by-production approach, the output-oriented technical inefficiency under the VRS model can be obtained by solving the following linear problem: = and = ⃗ . With these direction vectors, inefficiency scores can be easily derived.
Given these transformations, the model can be specified as follows:
, ≥ 0 ( = 1, … , )
As presented, the directional distance function in the previous models assesses the inefficiency associated with each type of output and provides an average (arithmetic mean) inefficiency score. A non-radial efficiency score for each good output can be obtained using the following propositions:
.
For the bad output, the efficiency can be computed as:
A "global" efficiency score can then be obtained by using the arithmetic mean:
We measure the efficiency of banks with and without the undesirable output and use the ratio of the obtained technical efficiency and risk-adjusted technical efficiency to analyze the effect of credit risk on efficiency estimates. We designate this effect as the "risk effect":
Risk Effect (RE) = output technical efficiency/output risk-adjusted technical efficiency
We are using the non-radial output efficiency scores, which are all greater than or equal to one, and scores closer to unity indicate more efficient DMUs. Therefore, if RE=1, including NPLs in the model has no effect on the bank's efficiency. If RE<1, the output risk-adjusted efficiency of a bank is higher than its technical efficiency, indicating that including risk deteriorated the efficiency of banks. If RE>1, the bank has performed well in terms of managing its credit risk.
For comparison purposes, we also estimate the model under the weak disposability assumption by using the non-uniform abatement factor model discussed in Kuosmanen et al. (2009) as an extension of the traditional WDA model (Färe et al., 2012) . The estimated program is:
Model (6) is quite similar to that used in Epure and Lafuente (2014) , except that here we consider all good outputs to be associated with the NPLs.
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As noted in Simar and Wilson (1998; , the nonparametric frontier estimation based on the DEA methodology is a subset of the true frontier technology, and hence, the output efficiency scores can be biased downward. To address this issue, Simar and Wilson (1998) developed the bootstrap methodology to derive bias-corrected efficiency scores. However, this proposed procedure relies on the homogeneity assumption in the technology modeling, and this assumption is equivalent to the homoscedasticity in the econometric estimation. Therefore, Simar and Wilson (2011) have recently suggested using the repeated samples selection technique (i.e., subsampling), which consists in drawing without replacement < observations from the original sample to use as a benchmark to evaluate the efficiency levels of all observations. We extended this approach to the ERBDDM and obtained the corresponding bias-corrected measures. 8 In fact, for the operationalization of the subsampling, we use the output efficiency scores (non-radial in this case) in Equations (3) to (5), which for practical purposes set all efficiency scores to be greater or equal to one. 9 The bias-corrected efficiency scores are provided using the less conservative rule of Efron and Tibshirani (1993) that specifies whether we should use the corrected or the uncorrected results (as a rule of thumb, they specify not to correct the obtained values unless |̂(̂( , ))| >̂(̂( , )) 4 ) (Daraio and Simar, 2007) . 10 The algorithm is run for several values of , and the appropriate value is selected given the data-driven rules discussed in Politis et al. (2001) and Bickel and Sakov (2008) . Regarding these rules, the choice of can be based on the minimization of a volatility criterion such as the standard deviation. 11 Overall, the bias-corrected efficiency scores estimated for the measures in formulas (3) to (5) are associated to the DEA models (2) and (6).
An additional issue worth mentioning is that we consider an unbalanced sample in this study.
As noted in Simar and Wilson (2011) , when considering unbalanced subsampling, where observations are randomly drawn from the original sample without accounting for the position of the DMU under evaluation, the model can result in some infeasibilities (an infinite value for the efficiency score). In this case, they recommend that these DMUs set the efficiency to 1.
However, following the discussion by Lee et al. (2011) , we decide to correct these infeasibilities due to the actual presence of super-efficiency on the input side (given that in this work, we are working on the output side). The correction we adopt is based on the "one model approach" of Chen and Liang (2011) . Moreover, the use of a non-radial approach for the subsampling can produce other infeasibilities due to the lack of convergence of the simplex algorithm. This can also be corrected using the "one model approach". We briefly present the algorithm that is used to solve this problem in Appendix A for all of the models. 12 Given the special nature of the by-production approach based on the estimation of two distinct subtechnologies, two convergence rates are considered for the efficiency assessment.
Data
In terms of the specification of the inputs and outputs, in this study, we employ the intermediation approach, which focuses on bank services. This approach was firstly introduced by Sealey and Lindley (1977) and has been used by many subsequent studies. In this approach, banks are viewed as intermediaries of financial services that purchase inputs to generate earning assets. Hence, in our models, we include three inputs: labor (number of full-time employees); capital (book value of fixed assets); and different funding sources (time deposits, saving deposits, and other borrowed funds). We then include two desirable outputs, loans and other earning assets, and one undesirable output, NPLs. Data for the period 1998 to 2012 are available in the banks' annual reports and are collected from the Central Bank of Iran archives (CBI 2005; 2012 [ Table 1 about here]
Empirical results and discussion
We have estimated one frontier for the entire period of time to prevent small sample issues. It is then assumed that all deficiencies are due to technical inefficiencies. 13 The sector's original and bias-corrected efficiency scores, which are estimated based on three different models (efficiency without bad output, by-production efficiency, and weak disposability efficiency), are presented in Table 2 . The interpretation is straightforward: a bank is efficient when its score equals one; it is inefficient when this score is greater than one. Depending on the approach used to account for the presence of undesirable outputs, the results presented in Table 2 indicate different implications.
In comparison to the model in which the undesirable output is not taken into account, the weak disposability model indicates higher output efficiency scores, while the by-production model indicates higher levels of inefficiency for the banks over the sample period (Table 2 ). This result simply indicates the contrast between these models and is worth further discussion. The 13 It is a strong assumption to maintain as lower efficiencies can be obtained in earlier periods in the case of technological progress. However, our choice of pooling the sample is the result of an arbitrage between discriminative efficiency scores and lack of this discriminatory power due to curse of dimensionality in small samples.
WDA approach states that reducing undesirable outputs is not costless to a firm and will also require decreasing the levels of good outputs by the same radial factor (Färe et al., 1996) . 14 Hence, the WDA results simply sketch the situation in which efficiency increases due to the introduction of additional constraints limiting the reference set attainable by inefficient banks (Table 2) . However, as mentioned earlier, despite its popularity, this statement and the WDA approach's ability to provide a good representation of undesirable output-generating technologies has been widely debated (Hailu and Veeman, 2001; Färe and Grosskopf, 2003) .
For instance, Murty et al. (2012) and Chen (2014) provide serious critiques and illustrative examples demonstrating that this approach does not yield the appropriate trade-offs between some inputs and the levels of bad outputs. Therefore, the by-production estimates, which capture the different trade-offs present in the production system more accurately, are considered to be appropriate alternatives to those from WDA in this study. Overall, our byproduction results, presented in Table 2 , show that the bank output-oriented efficiencies are generally lower compared to the case in which undesirable outputs are not considered, indicating that Iranian banks do not fully take advantage of the possible trade-offs between undesirable and good outputs. This issue will be discussed further later in the article. Table 1. 14 The null-jointness property of both types of outputs is also assumed. 15 This finding is consistent with those of Arjomandi et al. (2011; 2012; 2014) , who investigated the 2003-2008 period and found that banks' technical efficiency fell considerably following the regulatory changes.
[ Table 2 and Figure 1 about here] Table 3 On the whole, the by-production results reported in Table 3 indicate that before the private banks were permitted entry into the market (before 2001), the management of credit risk was not a substantial issue in the sector. However, after 2001, most likely due to increased competition and the new banking reforms, banks did not perform very well in this regard. But again, the extent of the REs varies among the bank groups, and we cannot conclude which group has managed its credit risk better during the study period. It should be noted that, using the WDA approach provided in Table 3 , one could reach a totally different conclusion with regard to the latter point: both bank groups have managed their credit risk very well (as REs are greater than unity in all of the years) and private banks are consistently more efficient than their rivals in that sense.
[ Table 3 about here]
Conclusion
This study has analyzed the efficiency of Iranian banks and their credit risk management using an innovative DEA by-production model covering the period 1998 to 2012. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our model, the by-production results are also compared with those of the WDA model. The two models showed different results for some aspects of bank efficiencies and risk effects. For instance, WDA findings indicated that both private and governmentowned banks have managed their credit risk appropriately and that private banks were consistently more efficient than their competitors in terms of credit risk control, but we were not able to make the same inference using the results obtained under the by-production approach. Given the discussed theoretical drawbacks associated with the WDA model, we have argued that the WDA results can be misleading and have therefore mainly focused on the byproduction approach-generated results to draw conclusions on the performance of Iranian banks.
Our findings tend to support the idea that although the banks' efficiency has improved over time, credit risk has had a negative influence on their performance. In fact, our findings reveal that both private and government-owned banks' credit risk performance became relatively poorer in the post-regulatory era. We could argue that political interference can be the most important problem in the Iranian banking system; the lack of independence of the central bank and other banks has generally resulted in the implementation of financial policies that pay inadequate attention to their impact on the sensitivity of financial markets and the current market structure. As a result, the ability of banks to manage their credit policies is limited.
Overall, based on the findings of this study, one can suggest that Iranian banks may need to improve their monitoring mechanisms to assess their loan risk more closely. Additionally, central-bank independence as well as limited government-regulatory power in the industry may be seen as an important means of boosting the efficiency and stability of the banking sector. Taking the same notations used for the by-production, we can write Π = The bad output "super"-efficiency is computed using the following: ̂= 2 * Ω 2 + (E + Ω ) * 1 ∑ (1 + )
=1
The global "super"-efficiency can be retrieved by computing the arithmetic mean of the two previous performance scores:
